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Decision making within dual career households: An analysis of the impact of 
child rearing upon career priorities and earnings 
 
Introduction 
In 1971, shortly before the introduction of equal pay legislation in the UK, just over half of 
women in the 25 to 44 years age range were economically active.  Currently the proportion is 
over three-quarters (Hardill et al, 2001), which indicates the radical economic and social 
transformation of women’s lives over the intervening period.1  Women’s participation in the 
labour market cannot, however, be understood in isolation from their position in kinship and 
family structures, and their relationship to childbearing and reproduction (Horrell and 
Humphries, 1995).2  Many studies have examined the effect that equal pay legislation and other 
public policy initiatives, such as the introduction of maternity benefits, parental rights and 
 
1 In 1974 in the UK for example, women comprised 2 per cent of managers, by 1998 the 
proportion was 18 per cent (ONS, 1998, 31).   The proportion of women in some professional 
occupations has also increased, accounting in 1998 for 64 per cent of teaching professionals; 33 
per cent of solicitors holding practising certificates in England and Wales (compared with 20 per 
cent in 1988); 24 per cent of barristers in 1998, compared with 14 per cent in 1987.  But in 1998, 
88 per cent of architects, town planner and surveyors were men; 71 per cent of business and 
financial professionals and 93 per cent of judges (ONS, 1998, 32) But women account for half of 
all university enrolments (Court, 1995). 
 
2. In the Spring of 2000 the problems of balancing work and home were placed centre stage 
when one of the UK’s most ‘visible’ dual career couples - Prime Minister Tony Blair and Cherie 
Booth - fourth child was born.  Tony Blair took a couple of weeks leave but prime carer, Cherie 
Booth withdrew from the labour market for several months of maternity leave (longer than the 
statutory period). With the impending birth of a child a woman has to instruct her employer 
about maternity leave but she and her partner have to reassess home and work.  This was very 
publicly done in the British press in spring 2000 in the case of Tony Blair and Cherie Booth.  
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nursery provision, etc., have had on women’s formal labour market participation, the power 
balance within households, and on the sharing of the tasks of social reproduction (Blossfeld and 
Drobnic, 2001; Gregson and Lowe, 1994; Momsen, 1999).  What appears to be accepted is that, 
despite almost 30 years of equal pay legislation, significant gender inequalities in earnings 
persist because the unequal allocation of domestic responsibilities has meant that women’s 
ability to commit to the labour market has been constrained, spatially and temporally, often 
resulting in having to work part-time.  Thus, whatever the intentions of the individuals 
concerned, the unequal allocation of domestic responsibilities appears to reinforce the 
“traditional” fundamental inequalities in economic power between male and female partners 
within households (Arber 1999; Ginn and Arber, 1995; Pahl, 1989).  
 
In this paper we focus on dual career households, who form part of a growing minority of 
households, between 10-20 per cent of all couples in Britain, the USA and Canada, in which 
both partners are pursuing careers (Hakim, 2000, 111). For the purposes of this paper, dual 
career households are defined as those in which both partners (that is, two heterosexual adults 
living as a couple in a two person or larger household) are in managerial and administrative, 
professional and associated professional and technical occupations; the types of occupation 
which tend to place particular demands on the individual and emphasise commitment (Erikson 
and Goldthorpe, 1992, 42). While the number of childless dual career households is increasing, 
about two-thirds of dual career households have had children and so will have had to confront 
the dual problems of deciding on career priorities and the allocation of child care and other 
domestic responsibilities. As suggested above, the unequal allocation of such responsibilities 
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means that though women in dual career households have income from paid work, this typically 
does not result in an equality of economic power vis à vis their partner (Arber, 1999, 177). Even 
so, Phillibeer and Vannoy-Hillier (1990) have shown that there are many mutual advantages to 
spouses within dual career couples beyond simply the additional income which may outweigh 
the practical inconvenience of having no full-time homemaker, especially when many have no 
children living at home. Shared social capital, intellectual and work interests can allow spouses 
greater achievements and upward mobility than they would achieve alone.  
 
Men and women in dual career households have to make decisions about career priorities after 
childbirth with many factors in mind, including levels of maternity pay; immediate loss of 
earnings if a career break is taken; availability of affordable childcare; desire to look after one’s 
child oneself; family support etc. They face the problem of co-ordinating two, often highly 
demanding and time consuming careers and therefore such households are likely to experience 
tensions whenever domestic responsibilities, such as childcare, may necessitate one or both 
partners to divert time and energy from pursuing their careers. Childbirth is one of the most 
physically and emotionally demanding periods of a woman’s life, but since the 1970s British 
women have had statutory maternity rights (Table 1) but these rights are limited when compared 
with other EU countries (Dex and Joshi, 1999; Drew, 1998). Gender equality in incomes remains 
resilient as women’s pay/hours drop relative to men’s once they have children due to the 
continued unequal division of the tasks of social reproduction (Arber, 1999, 177; Folbre, 1994, 
51; Ginn and Arber, 1995; Hochschild, 1997; Jacobsen, 1994, 85; Jacobsen and Rayack, 1996).   
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TABLE 1 
In this paper we investigate the impact that child rearing has upon the within household 
distribution of earnings in respect of a sample of dual career households located in the East 
Midlands region of the UK.  An individual’s current level of earnings is the outcome of many 
decisions taken over their life-course, though various institutional constraints and cultural 
expectations inevitably have a significant impact on these apparently “free choices” (Deaux and 
Major, 1987).  Generally, relationships formed around family and co-habitation/marriage imply a 
large element of “common interests” in order to override individual competitiveness and 
demands for mobility when decisions concerning the allocation of domestic responsibilities have 
to be made.  Occasionally therefore one or more partners may be expected to sacrifice (give a 
lower priority to) their own particular career interests to invest more resources in the collective 
project called “family” (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 1995, p.52).  Indeed Beck and Beck-
Gernsheim argue that “every marriage consists of two marriages, the husband’s and the wife’s” 
(ibid, p.62). 
 
 
High status and well-paid careers are predominantly full-time, highly demanding, competitive 
and “progressive” (Evetts, 2000, 60), with part-timers and those with significant career “breaks”, 
in consequence, often regarded by employers as less dedicated, less professional and more “time 
deviant” (Epstein et al, 1999).  Thus, whenever significant child rearing responsibilities limit 
their full participation in the labour market, women’s ability to pursue careers and their earnings 
potential can be expected to be particularly constrained spatially and temporally (Hanson and 
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Pratt, 1995; Jarvis et al, 2001; McKie et al, 1999). Moreover women in dual career households, 
even childless women, are more likely to be in relationships where the male career takes 
precedence in location and mobility decisions, and she is the ‘trailing spouse’ with the 
‘follower’/ secondary career, which is unplanned and erratic (Bruegel, 1996; Hardill et al, 1997). 
Typically for the trailing spouse, household migration is not associated with positive career 
developments. Thus, both past and anticipated household migration and child rearing have for a 
long time been recognised as producing significant dampening influences upon the life cycle 
wage evolution of married women (Mincer, 1978, 771).   
 
This paper analyses the impact of child rearing upon male and female earnings and participation 
rates within dual career households. The Personnel Directors of five organisations based in 
Nottingham in the East Midlands were approached to help in the identification of dual career 
households - including health service and higher education establishments, a major bank, and 
two large market oriented private sector manufacturing companies (one engaged in the food and 
drink industry and the other in pharmaceuticals).  In this way we gained access to staff in a 
relatively comprehensive range of managerial, professional and associated occupations.  Each of 
the participating organisations has a different organisational structure, and hence the internal 
labour market conditions are somewhat different.  In each of the dual career households 
identified, at least one partner is employed at a Nottingham base by one of the five employers.  
The other partner could work for any employer (or indeed work in a self-employed capacity) in 
any location.  
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A semi-structured self-completion questionnaire survey (for a fuller discussion of the methods 
see Hardill et al, 1999) was first undertaken.  The questionnaire schedule was in three parts, with 
sections on each career, including jobs held and places of residence since 1980, educational 
attainment and ‘their’ career (general household information).  In most cases the female partner 
completed the section on ‘their’ career.  An analysis of this longitudinal dataset for 130 
households is presented in this paper.  A sub-set (thirty households) of those who completed the 
survey element of the research also participated in the in-depth qualitative interviews. Each 
partner was interviewed separately (Pahl, 1989; Valentine, 1999).  We also draw on the 
qualitative interview material in this paper. 
 
Most of the face-to-face interviews took place in their homes, and were biographies - life 
narratives - of a very intense nature (Sizoo, 1997).  The interview schedules are not a factual 
record but texts structured by the interviewees interests, commitments, quirks etc, ‘constructed 
subjectivity’ (McLaughlin, 1997, 13). The intention of the face-to-face interviews was not to 
collect detailed quantitative information, but rather to provide insights into the factors taken into 
account by dual career households relating to juggling work and home.  We have used the 
interview schedules to facilitate the recognition of the household in terms of a dynamic network 
of negotiated relations (social, cultural, emotional and economic) exploring issues of mobility 
and power (Hardill, et al 1997). In many instances the accounts of their lives together were told 
in very different ways by the two partners, and on the homeward journey we recounted the 
interviews comparing and contrasting each version of ‘their’ story, especially in the households 
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with children. Some male partners did not mention the children, while in all the interviews with 
women who had been mothers, issues relating to their offspring featured prominently. 
 
Our empirical analysis draws first on the quantitative questionnaire data relating to 130 
households and this is followed by an analysis of the qualitative interview material. We find that the 
average earnings and hours spent at work by the female members of the surveyed households are 
significantly lower than comparable males, though the differences are not statistically important in 
respect of (the predominantly, younger) households that have never had child rearing 
responsibilities.  The earnings and hours of work of females with children, irrespective of whether or 
not the children remain dependants or have left the household (“empty nesters”), are however 
significantly lower than their male partners.  The males in these households also have significantly 
higher earnings than other males, though the difference is largely accounted for by other earnings-
relevant factors such as their greater average age, longer job tenure and the slightly greater number 
of hours spent at work.  
 
The results suggest that, although child rearing appears to permanently alter the within household 
distribution of earnings (and hours of paid work), total household income and hours of outside paid 
work seems not to be materially affected. Thus, whilst in principle child rearing responsibilities 
could involve both partners reducing their labour market participation and earnings by similar 
amounts, in practice it appears usually to result in the dual career household opting, as in the 
“traditional male breadwinner” household, to prioritise the male partner’s career and earnings 
potential.  A consequence of this within-household gender specialisation and the prioritising of the 
 
 
 
 9
                    
male’s career appears, however, to be that the earnings of the females in dual career households 
tends to decline significantly relative to that of their male partners. Follow-up interviews with a 
subset of the surveyed households also indicated a widespread recognition that child-rearing 
responsibilities are (and should be) predominantly allocated to female partners and that this was 
likely to have negative consequences in respect of their career prospects and earnings potential.  
 
The Data and Descriptive Statistics  
 
In Table 2 we provide descriptive statistics relating to the pay, hours of work and the various job and 
personal (i.e., human capital) characteristics of the male and female partners in all 130 dual career 
households. 3  We also provide comparative statistics relating to the 47 households that have never 
included children, the 33 households currently still containing one or more dependent children and 
the remaining 50 households that did once include, but do not currently contain, dependent children 
(the “empty  nesters”).   
 
Table 2 
 
 
 
3. We actually obtained information relating to 136 households. However, of the 272 individuals 
involved, 4 females and 2 males were temporarily unemployed at the time of the survey. As 
information on these 6 individuals’ pay and hours of work was not available, the empirical analysis 
reported in tables 1 and 2 have been based on the 130 complete dual career households.  
 
 
 
 10
                                                                                                                                                            
The three columns of Table 2 relate to the 130 male, female and dual career household averages. As 
can be seen from Table 2, the males are on average 2 years older and have almost 2 years longer job 
tenure than their female partners and are paid on average almost £9,000 per annum more.  On 
average, the males claim to work almost 10 hours per week longer than the females in the sample.  
The relative proportions of males and females with at least a degree-level and/or a professional 
qualification are virtually identical at 86.0% and 85.2% respectively.  However, in terms of the 
sectors and the occupations of the males and females there are some notable differences.  A 
significantly higher proportion of males are employed within the higher education sector (38.2% 
versus 26.4%), and are in managerial (30.8% versus 19.8%) or professional (56.6% versus 49.2%) 
occupations.   
 
Also, in Table 2 are descriptive statistics relating to three dual career household types: 47 
households in which neither partner has raised children; 33 households containing one or more 
dependent children and 50 that are either “empty nests” or contain non-dependent off-spring.  As can 
be seen from the table, the 47, predominantly younger, households with no experience of child 
rearing, having the lowest average household income (2x£18.2), lowest job tenure and the highest 
household average number of hours paid employment – due largely to the significantly higher 
average working hours of the females in these households vis à vis the average hours of paid work 
reported by the females in the other households (41 versus approximately 35 hours per week).  The 
other households generally consist of older couples, with higher average household earnings despite 
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the fall in the hours and pay of the female partners.  The differences between the households with 
and without experience of child rearing appear to indicate that: 
 
a. The average pay and working hours of the male and female partners in households with no child 
rearing experience do not appear to be significantly different, particularly given the slightly older 
age and job tenure characteristics of the males relative to their female partners.  
 
b. Large differences in terms of average pay and hours of work between the male and female 
partners appear in households with children.  Total average household income is highest for this 
group because the high pay received by the males more than makes up for the significantly 
reduced pay associated with the female partners’ reduced work force participation rates. 
 
c. A significant redistribution of within household career priorities appears to be indicated by the 
greatly increased earnings and working hours differentials towards the male partners in 
households with child rearing responsibilities.  The results for the 50 empty nest households 
also suggest that this radical difference in the average pay and working hours of partners with 
child rearing duties, remains even after the child rearing duties have long ceased.  
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Empirical Hypotheses and Modelling 
 
The descriptive statistics shown in Table 2 are helpful in showing up several interesting differences 
between household characteristics and the pay and labour force participation differences within 
households.  It is, however, clear that in order to isolate the impact of child rearing upon the relevant 
household and individual pay and labour market participation variables, a multivariate model will be 
required to provide an appropriate benchmark by which to sensibly evaluate any apparent deviations 
from “comparable” pay levels.  
 
In empirical studies of relative pay levels, the market determined pay level of an individual is 
usually conceived to be a multiplicative function of their individual supply relevant (human capital) 
attributes, the demand relevant characteristics associated with their specific occupation, job and 
employer and their labour participation rate, i.e.,  
 
                        PAYi* = Ai x Personaliβ x JOBiβ x HOURSiβ                    (1) 
 
 Typically, empirical models used to estimate relative pay levels across a sample of heterogeneous 
individuals have estimated a natural log version of (1) whereby individual i’s  logged pay is 
estimated as a linear function of the logged values of the number of hours worked, a vector of other 
job attributes and a vector of personal characteristics, i.e., 
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Log(PAYi) = Log(a) +   βLog(HOURSi) + Σβ(JOBi)  + Σβ(Personali) + ui                  (2) 
 
where, Log(PAYi) = log of individual i’s gross annual earnings from employment, 
            Log(Hoursi) = log of individual i’s number of total hours worked per annum, 
            Σ (JOBi) =  vector of demand-relevant occupational and sector dummy variables relating to    
          individual i’s current job, 
            Σ(Personali)  = vector of supply-relevant labour market personal attributes relating to              
          individual i, i.e., higher educational/professional qualifications, job tenure and age. 
 
The model described in (2), which we label “Model 1”, provides our ‘gender blind’ pay benchmark 
(i.e., the basis for evaluating our null hypothesis) for each individual. Our empirical analysis focuses 
on whether the explanatory power of “Model 1” can be improved upon by including additional 
gender, labour market participation rates (hours at work) and child rearing variables to the estimating 
equation.  The alternative hypotheses are evaluated by augmenting full and sub-sample estimates of 
Model 1 with combinations of the above variables.  
 
It is clear from the descriptive statistics presented in Table 2 that gender participation rates differ, 
particularly within households with children.  This is confirmed by the regression estimates detailed 
in (3) below, whereby the LOG(HOURS) variable is regressed on the following 3 dummy variables: 
GENDER = 1 if the individual concerned is female (and therefore GENDER = 0, identifies the 
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individual as a male); CHILD = 1 for all individuals in households that contain or have contained 
children; and, GENDER*CHILD =1 identifies only those women with children: 
 
Log(HOURSi)  = 7.672 + 0.018*CHILD - 0.113*GENDER - 0.246*GENDER*CHILD + ui     (3) 
                        (274.6)*** (0.43)               (2.48)***               (3.30)*** 
Adjusted R2 = 17.5%    F-Ratio= 19.3*** 
Notes:  White (1980) Heteroskedasticity-Consistent t-values in parenthesis. 
Significance levels: *≤ 0.10;   **≤0.05;   ***≤ 0.01. 
 
The average annual hours in paid employment of childless males is represented by the constant term, 
(which implies that childless males work approximately 2150 hours per annum, i.e., e7.672 = 2150).  
The above results indicate that male participation rates are essentially identical irrespective of 
whether or not they have children because the coefficient on the CHILD variable is statistically 
indistinguishable from zero.  However, females without children are estimated to be in paid 
employment only 89.0% (i.e., the exponent of the coefficient on GENDER =  e-0.113 = 0.89) of the 
hours worked by childless males. The large and statistically significant negative coefficient on the 
GENDER*CHILD variable shows that women with children have much lower participation rates 
than women without children.  The estimated coefficient implies that they work only approximately 
78% of the hours worked by women without children, i.e., e-0.246 = 0.782.  Clearly the differential 
participation rate of women with children compared to men (with or without children) is much 
greater.  The results suggest that women with children work slightly less than 70% of the hours 
worked by childless males (i.e., e-0.246-0.113 = 0.698).  
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Career success (and high pay) typically requires (at least) full time participation and an absence of 
any extended career breaks.  Hence, the differences in participation rates arising from gender 
imbalances in the distribution of child care responsibilities detailed in (3) can be expected to have a 
disproportionately negative impact upon the relative earnings of women with children. In terms of 
our pay level models, empirically this implies that the elasticity of pay with respect to the number of 
hours worked (the β coefficient on the LOG(HOURS) variable) should be greater than unity for both 
males and females to reflect this “long-hours” culture associated with career building. However, the 
elasticity of pay with respect to hours worked should be even higher in the case of females 
particularly those with children and/or working part-time, since any career breaks or an inability to 
work full-time will have a significant negative effect upon career advancement and earnings 
opportunities.   
 
Given the above, we empirically evaluate the following three hypotheses: 
 
H1: The Gender Factor (Model 1). 
Female pay levels will be significantly lower and the elasticity with respect to labour participation 
rates will be significantly higher than otherwise “comparable” males.  However, due to equal pay 
rules that prohibit explicit discrimination on gender grounds, none of the other estimated coefficients 
in the pay model are expected to systematically differ between men and women.  H1 is evaluated by 
estimating Model 1 three times (using data relating to both males and females, males only and 
females only) and then comparing the statistical significance of the differences in coefficient 
estimates.  These results are shown in  Table 3. 
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By augmenting Model 1 with 2 new variables, CHILD and CHILD*LOG(HOURS), the following 
hypothesis may be evaluated: 
H2: The Differential Parenting Factor (Models 2 and 3). 
Male and Female (Model 2), or more likely only female (Model 3), pay levels in dual career 
households which contain (or have contained) one or more children will be lower (i.e., βCHILD < 0) 
and the elasticity of their pay with respect to their labour participation rates will be higher than 
otherwise “comparable” males and females (i.e., βCHILD*LOG(HOURS) > 0).  The empirical results 
relating to the evaluation of H2 are shown in Table 4 and consist of three estimates of Model 2 using 
all observations, males only and females only.  Also, included in Table 4 is Model 3 which uses all 
observations and includes a CHILD*GENDER dummy variable (to distinguish women with 
children from all other individuals) and a CHILD*GENDER*LOG(HOURS) variable to measure 
the differential elasticity of women with children’s participation rates relative to all other 
individuals.  This model explicitly tests whether the significantly lower participation rates of women 
with children leads to a more than proportionate decrease in their earnings levels vis à vis all other 
(male and female) individuals. 
 
H3: The Household-Type Factor. 
The gender factor suggested by H1 will be absent (or less apparent) in households without children 
but stronger for households with children  if child-rearing duties lead to reduced participation rates 
and are largely responsible for the negative impact upon female pay.  H3 is evaluated by comparing 
separately estimated versions of Model 1 and Model 4 (which includes the GENDER dummy 
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variable and the GENDER*LOG(HOURS) variable) for households with children (CHILD=1) and 
without children (CHILD=0).  Empirical support for H3 would imply that these 2 new gender 
variables will be significantly negative (i.e., βGENDER < 0) and positive (i.e., βGENDER*LOG(HOURS) > 
0) respectively for the estimates using data from only households with children but insignificant in 
the estimates using only no child household observations.  These estimates are shown in Table 5.  
 
Empirical Findings 
In Table 3, the empirical results relating to our gender-free pay determination model are presented 
using all observations and then separate estimates of male and female pay models are presented. 
Turning first to the Model 1 estimates using all observations, it is clear that the model is well-
specified in that the estimated parameters are all highly statistically significant, in the anticipated 
direction and that overall they explain a high proportion  (over 83%) of the cross-sectional variance 
in the pay levels of the individuals in the sample.  As anticipated the age-wage profile appears to be 
of an inverted U-shape with the influence of age positive up to slightly over 50 years of age, after 
which age has a negative influence upon pay.  Though educational/professional qualifications, job 
tenure and being in a managerial or professional occupation all increase pay, by far the most 
important influence upon pay appears to be the number of hours worked (exhibiting commitment, 
putting the job first).  Moreover, the coefficient of 1.695 indicates that the elasticity of pay with 
respect to changes in the number of hours worked is very much more than unity, i.e., that high rates 
of pay per hour are associated with jobs which involve relatively high hours of work and, of course, 
vice versa.  As anticipated the control variables relating to the individual’s sector of employment 
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indicate that individuals working in higher education or the public sector receive significantly less 
than individuals employed by private sector or interestingly NHS organizations (both nurses and  
doctors, including  a number of consultants).   
 
Table 3 
 
The separately estimated male and female models are also shown in Table 3.  As anticipated by H1, 
the “coefficient differences” column, shows that both the difference in the constant term and the 
participation rate are significantly different for men and women.  Apart from the smaller coefficient 
(at 5% confidence levels) associated with women working in managerial occupations, all of the 
other estimated coefficients in the separately estimated male and female models are statistically of 
identical magnitude, again as anticipated by H1.  The highly statistically significant positive 
coefficient difference on the Log(HOURS) variable is important as it indicates a higher elasticity of 
female earnings relative to males of 0.634, whose  percentage change in earnings with respect to 
percentage changes in the number of hours worked is closer to unity (i.e., Log(HOURS) = 1.159), 
Thus, increases (decreases) in the number of hours worked by females appears to have a 
disproportionately positive (negative) effect upon their pay levels, i.e., female pay is more highly 
geared than males with respect to the number of hours worked, thus highlighting the very significant 
negative impact that part-time working has on women’s careers and earnings opportunities.  
 
The results of Model 2 and Model 3 are shown in Table 4 and it will be recalled that these models 
are included to empirically evaluate H2.  Model 2 includes the 2 new variables that evaluate the 
 
 
 
 19
influence that child rearing duties has upon earnings. The version of Model 2 estimated using the full 
sample of 260 individuals assumes unrealistically that the impact of child rearing upon partners 
earning is identical for both men and women. Nevertheless, as can be seen from the table, the 
addition of the new variables, CHILD and CHILD*LOG(HOURS) with negative and positive 
coefficients respectively, marginally increases the adjusted R2 of the estimates vis à vis Model 1, and 
the F-ratio for the new variables is also marginally significant (at 10% confidence levels).  As was 
also evident from the gender analyses presented in Table 3, child rearing responsibilities appear to 
increase the elasticity of earnings with respect to differences in participation rates – though the effect 
is much smaller statistically than in the case of gender.   
 
The separately estimated male and female versions of Model 2 are also shown in Table 4.  It will be 
noted that the coefficients on the child rearing variables for the female estimates are both between 4 
and 5 times as large as the male coefficient estimates which, as anticipated by H2, indicates that any 
child rearing effects upon earnings are far greater for females than for males.  Indeed, the male 
coefficients on the child rearing variables are essentially zero. Table 4 also presents the estimates for 
Model 3 based on all 260 male and female observations.  This model assumes that the earnings 
equation for females with child rearing responsibilities, who also generally have the lowest 
participation rate, differs from that of both other women and all males, but only in regard to the 
elasticity of earnings in respect of participation rates. The results show that this model increases the 
explanatory power of the empirical estimates vis à vis both Model 1 and Model 2 and that, as 
anticipated by H2, the coefficients on the 2 child rearing and participation variables are each 
individually statistically significant at 1% confidence levels.   
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Finally, Table 5 presents empirical estimates of Model 1 and Model 4 by household type, i.e., those 
with children and those households that have never contained dependent children.  Model 4 is 
simply Model 1 with the addition of the following 2 “gender” variables,  GENDER (where 1=female 
and 0=male) and GENDER*Log(HOURS), an interaction term which measures the differential 
earnings elasticity of females relative to males with respect to the number of hours worked.  As 
suggested by H3, it is expected that the earnings equation for males and females in no child 
households will be identical and that the addition of the gender variables will not have any 
significant impact on the explanatory power of the no child household Model 4 estimates vis à vis 
Model 1 (the gender-blind benchmark model).  In contrast, H3 suggests that for the households with 
children there will be a marked gender difference in earnings equations and that the addition of the 
gender/participation rate variables will result in Model 4 having a significantly higher explanatory 
power vis à vis Model 1.  As can be seen from the table, the empirical estimates confirm the above 
expectations.  For the households with children, Model 4 results in an improved adjusted R2 vis à vis 
Model 1 and each of the 2 new variables are individually statistically significant at 1% confidence 
levels.   For the households without children there is no evidence of any statistical difference 
between male and female earnings equations since the adjusted R2 of Model 4 declines vis à vis 
Model 1 and neither of the 2 new variables are of any statistical importance. Thus, statistically 
significant differences between male and female pay levels and in the elasticity of pay with respect 
to participation rates are only apparent in the case of households with children. What these results 
seem to indicate is that prioritising both careers in dual career households is not generally possible 
when the household includes dependent children and that the male partners’ careers appears to 
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‘lead’, and that differences remain even when age is controlled for. We now draw on more 
qualitative material for the sub-set of the 130 households who participated in follow-up in-depth 
interviews to provide additional insights into these results.  In the interviews the lived reality of 
juggling work and home especially after childbirth was described. In some interviews factors 
external to the household (employer attitudes, child care provision, etc.) were mentioned as 
constraints while other interviewees emphasised factors internal to the household, such as 
problems of ‘committing’ to two careers and the division of the tasks of social reproduction.   
 
Nineteen of the thirty households who participated in the in-depth interviews had children, and 
in 14 the female partner took either a career break or adjusted her working hours by working 
part-time. Only one male partner had taken a career break, and another was planning to (see 
below), while a number of other male partners took a few days of their holiday entitlement 
around the time of the birth of heir child.  But most made no adjustment to their working pattern 
at the time of the birth and afterwards as Sarah4 emphasised in her interview, “James pursued his 
career as if we had no children, indeed as if he was still single, all the give has been on my part”.  
 
Childbirth greatly increases the unpaid caring work associated with ‘home’, and a renegotiation 
of the tasks of social reproduction occurred first during maternity leave. One interviewee, 
 
4 James (self-employed consultant) and Sarah (university researcher) are both in their early 
fifties, have two grown up children, and have lived together for over 30 years.  They met at 
school, they went to the same university (he was a couple of years ahead of her) and his job has 
always ‘led’ and as a result they have moved inter-regionally four times 
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Becky5 was on maternity leave when she was interviewed, and while she intended to return to 
work she did express concern during the interview as to how she was going to juggle work and 
home at the end of her maternity leave. Prior to their child’s arrival Becky had done most of the 
unpaid work in the home, but she did emphasise that her partner, Gary also helped, “a lot”. On 
maternity leave she had slipped into a routine of having sole responsibility for childcare, and 
doing some of the tasks that Gary had done before she went on maternity leave, and 
acknowledged that she was making “a rod for my own back”. Like a number of other women 
interviewed, Becky commented that it was during a period of maternity leave that she started 
doing more and more household tasks and assumed responsibility for most childcare duties.  
When she does go back to work she thought it would be hard to break the pattern and share the 
household work more equitably.  Moreover her job as a software consultant involves business 
trips away from home and she worried about how she would be able to do this because while 
Gary is a supportive partner this support would not extend to him having sole responsibility for 
the care of their son if she was away from the family home overnight on a business trip. 
 
For some interviewees committing to children through a career break/working part-time for a 
spell was a conscious choice to enjoy motherhood; some commented that they could not see the 
point in having a child and then not ‘being there’ for them. For other women a career 
break/working part-time was the result of the gender division of labour in their household, they 
reduced their working hours as a coping strategy, and as such childbirth resulted in the 
 
5 Becky (software consultant) and Gary (accountant) are in their early 30s and met at university.  
They have a baby son and while they prioritise his career, until her maternity leave they both 
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suppression of their personal aspirations. Claire6 for example, withdrew from the labour market 
for five years despite the fact that she had the largest salary, but in their ‘traditional’ household, 
Claire was prime carer, with little help from Ian. Once the children were old enough she started 
working part-time and now works full-time but on a fixed-term contract.  Ian is keen they have a 
third child but Claire is not so keen as it would necessitate her giving up paid work again.  They 
have had bad experiences with child minders, and this has been a cause of tension in the relationship. 
 This is being exacerbated by what Claire sees as Ian’s slow recognition of the responsibilities of 
being a parent although she does accept that he is beginning, “to grow into fatherhood”.   
 
Only in a minority of households did both partners make career ‘adjustments’ for childcare. Both 
Nigel and Anne7 have taken time out to care for their daughter. Anne was prime carer for one 
year, “When I was pregnant with Becky, it was Nigel’s first child. He hated his job [social work] 
and I wanted to get back to work and it was an obvious solution. He really wanted to look after 
Becky”. Nigel said, “we actually role reversed as they call it...for me it was my first child, I felt 
that by going out to work I was missing out on something important”. He went on to say that, 
“we don’t particularly want both of us to be working full-time...the pressures attendant on two 
 
worked very long hours 
6 Claire (senior social worker) and Ian (self-employed surveyor) are in their early forties and have 
been together since University days and have two teenage children.  Ian’s career has always ‘led’ 
7 Nigel (a part time lecturer with contracts with three employers) and Anne (a school teacher) are 
both in their early forties, and have been together for ten years. This is Anne’s second marriage. 
Anne’s two children from her first marriage live with them along with their eight year old 
daughter.  Anne has the ‘lead’ career 
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full-time careers would be enormous”. Both partners in another household8 are planning career 
adjustments for a child they hope to have. Samantha indicated that, “we will probably try and 
have children next year. I will take maternity leave...at the end of those six months Simon will 
apply for a career break [5 years]. He can’t wait - seriously - he cannot wait to give up work”. In 
his interview Simon stressed he was feeling disillusioned with his current job. 
 
A significant number of the women did talk at length about employer workplace-related issues. 
One older woman (in her 50s at the time of the interview) in an ‘empty nester’ household 
emphasised that when she was pregnant with her first child her employer had no maternity 
scheme, and women were expected to ‘disappear’. Sarah resigned her post when she was 
pregnant, “you have to think back to 1969 /70 [when] the whole attitude to women with children 
working was very different.  When I think back, women who graduated with me, quite a few of 
them got married and went [straight] into part-time jobs and never had full-time jobs.  That was 
the social attitude you had in the Sixties”.  
 
Since this time a whole array of equal opportunities legislation has given women statutory 
maternity rights (see Table 1).  Studies of the impact of this legislation have indicated that it is 
women managers and professionals, like the ones who participated in this study, who have 
benefited the most.  Indeed female managers and professionals in dual career households, who 
 
8 Simon (a Sales Executive) and Samantha (a Senior Analyst Programmer) are in their early 
thirties, and work full time for the same manufacturing company. They have been together for 
just over a decade, and met at work when they were both, ‘on a fast-track general management 
scheme’ 
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are mothers, have a stronger attachment to the labour market after childbirth than do mothers in 
other households (McRae, 1997). Our quantitative analysis suggests that gender differences in 
career prioritisation remain when age is controlled for.  One possible explanation is that for 
younger households, even those with egalitarian attitudes, it is the lived reality of new economy, 
of nonstandard employment contracts; unpredictable working hours and the long hours culture, 
that runs counter to these egalitarian principles. Cherie Booth regularly talks about the struggle 
she has in juggling home and work9 (Bunting, 2000). The reality of the new economy was 
certainly described in some interviews.  Some men and women were employed on fixed term 
contracts as was university researcher Diana.10 “A year into my three year contract I became 
pregnant. I know that [the Head of Department] was most displeased.  When he found out that I 
was entitled to maternity leave I think that upset him even more. He took the view that women 
are either a mother or a professional woman and you can't be both. He just felt that things were 
likely to become complicated where a woman had to juggle the responsibilities of a profession as 
well as looking after young children.  He felt that the Department would be short-changed”.  
 
 
9 The Blair household is also assisted by paid domestic help 
10 Diana (mid 30s, university lecturer) and Bob (mid 40s, further education lecturer) met when 
Diana was a student.  They have a baby son and while they prioritise her career, they are very 
much equal partners. They employ a nanny to care for their son.  Diana has held a series of fixed 
term contracts but now has a tenured lectureship. 
10 Becky (software consultant) and Gary (accountant) are in their early 30s and met at university. 
 They have a baby son and while they prioritise his career, until her maternity leave they both 
worked very long hours 
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She went on to say, “whilst I was pregnant I was doing more (work) than I should have done.  I 
was taken into hospital for an emergency C-section because I developed hypertension.  I'm sure 
it was all work-related, [due to] the stress that was on me really. I think words fail me when it 
comes to describing the pressures that were placed on me, not necessarily verbal.  I suppose, like 
many women do who are pregnant or otherwise, we tend to over compensate and really work flat 
out.  I suppose I was working flat out at a time in my life I shouldn't have been”. Diana has since 
moved to another university and has secured a tenured lectureship.  
 
Some interviewees stressed that their jobs entail temporal and spatial flexibility and talked about 
the lived realities of uncertain working hours or the need to travel for business including nights 
away from the family home.  The net result tended to be female partners rather than the male 
partners in our sample ‘committing’ less to work (and personal aspirations) after childbirth in an 
attempt to create a meaningful home life.  Jane11 and Mark are an egalitarian household when it 
comes to decision making, but they both work unpredictable hours.  While Jane works from a 
fixed base, Mark travels a lot within the country. When she first returned to work after maternity 
leave it was to her full-time post, but as Mark’s hours were more unpredictable than hers, she 
was responsible for taking their child to nursery and collecting her on an evening.  At work she 
used to get anxious that she would not be able to leave with sufficient time to travel to pick her 
daughter up before the nursery closed.  As a food technologist she worked on a production line 
and could never exactly predict when her working day would end.  The pressures of this 
 
11 Jane (food technologist) and Mark (sales representative) are in their mid-30s and have been 
together for about a decade.  They have a young child who attends a private nursery 
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uncertainty resulted in her switching to part-time (21 hours a week), with hours she feels are 
‘about right’.  She did comment that her employer is “prejudiced against part-time work”. Thus 
childbirth can impact negatively on career development often because employers and/or 
colleagues interpret a career break/part-time work as committing to home rather than to work 
(Epstein et al, 1999; Hochschild, 1997). 
 
Finally, Joanne,12 a General Practitioner also talked about her decision to work part-time after 
the birth of her son. “The original agreement of the contract was that I would do half time until 
the child or children went to school and at that point I would have the option of going back full-
time if I wanted to. The average working week is 80 hours, I was not prepared to do that if I had 
a family, I didn’t see the point in having children and leaving them with somebody else. I do 40 
hours with the practice, the rest of the time I’m at home or doing my own thing, or doing 
paperwork for the practice, all this administrative stuff … with nights and weekends it is 60 
hours”.  Thus even though she is part-time the number of hours she devotes to the practice is 60 
hours per week, considerably more hours per week than a typical full-time contract of 37 hours.  
Joanne created space for her family by working part-time. Joanne still is committed to her work, 
and certainly works more hours than she is contracted to work, but she also wants to commit to 
home. Ken her partner is a regional sales manager and his job entails a lot of travel, his car is his 
office and every week he spends some nights away from the family home. The reality of Ken’s 
job is that he is not always around during the week to share in the running of the home. While 
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most of the households have commodified some of the tasks of ‘home’ (cleaning etc), and use is 
also made of labour saving devices, it was the lack of quality of their home life following 
childbirth that caused a readjustment of working hours.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
The statistical results relating to the 130 dual career households along with the interview data tell a 
consistent story.  Taken together, they provide strong empirical support for arguing that female 
participation rates fall when they have children and that their reduction in the number of hours in 
paid employment typically results in a disproportionate fall in their subsequent earnings levels.  This 
disproportionate fall in earnings when participation rates are reduced clearly disadvantages women 
given the unequal distribution of domestic, particularly child rearing, duties within dual career 
households.  Given the relationships between career progression and full-time and uninterrupted 
employment, it is not difficult to understand how for many women, even fairly short breaks away 
from work to attend to child rearing duties can often result in ‘discontinuous careers’, consisting of a 
series of relatively low paid and unchallenging, but convenient managerial and professional part-
time jobs (Bonney and Love, 1991).  Having children, however, tends to marginally increase the 
participation and earnings levels of males within such households whilst also having a significant 
depressive effect upon the earnings levels of females. This appears to be indicative of a household 
trade-off decision whereby the career of the male is given a higher priority and that of the female 
partner is (at least temporarily) sacrificed to some extent because of the need to ‘be there’ for 
children despite the use of  childcare by some households. 
 
12 Joanne (doctor) and Ken (regional sales manager) are in their early forties and met about a 
decade ago when they both had established careers.  Joanne has been married before.  They have 
a five year old son at a private school and they employ a nanny 
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The results provided in this paper also indicates that within household parity in terms of decision-
making and career development is not the norm, particularly once childrearing duties have to be 
allocated.  Although both partners attach importance to, and devote much energy to, pursuing 
their respective careers, in most households one career – generally the male career - tends to be 
prioritised; these are the very households that appear to ‘individualise’ the most as they adopt 
more ‘traditional’ gender roles (see also Dormsch and Ladwig, 1998).   
 
Our results also appear to suggest that the lived reality of working in the new economy is 
adversely affecting the principles and practice of gender equity in those younger households that 
aspire to egalitarian relationships (Walby, 1995).  Juggling two careers in the new economy, an 
environment with a long hours culture, and of intensified mobility, as well as trying to create a 
meaningful homelife in which to nurture children, appears to be impossible.  This appears to be 
the case even in households with egalitarian principles, who offload some of the tasks of social 
reproduction to others through commodification.  The working environment of the new economy 
appears to be perpetuating gendered career trajectories in 2002, and unless working patterns 
change for managers and professionals the pattern of female sacrifice is unlikely to change 
(Hochschild, 1997). 
 
Working part-time or taking a career break though done for short-term ‘convenience’, in order to 
juggle ‘work’ and ‘home’ (such as wanting to prioritise home and be there for the children, 
moving to another part of the country/abroad for a partner’s new job), is likely to significantly 
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affect their long-term financial health, pension entitlements etc.  Although recent changes in UK 
divorce law relating to splitting pensions could be seen as away of militating the negative effects 
of domestic duties that reduce women’s earnings. 
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Table 1 
 
MATERNITY/PATERNITY RIGHTS IN THE UK 
 
• Maternity leave entitlement 18 weeks, not linked to length of service with employer. Receipt of 
Statutory Maternity Pay (SMP) payable for these18 weeks is dependent on working for employer for 
26 weeks plus 15 weeks prior to expected delivery date and paying National Insurance contributions. 
Additional leave of up to 40 weeks with the right to return to work may also be taken but requires one 
year’s continuous employment to qualify and applies only to mother. 
• Maternity allowance for those employees not qualifying for SMP or who are self-employed. 
• Maternity grant for those in receipt of state benefits. 
• Parental leave may be taken, unpaid, by either parent but they must have one years continuous service 
with their employer, be the natural or adoptive parent, and give 21 days’ notice to their employer. The 
child must be under 5 years of age. Up to 4 weeks may be taken in a year in periods of one week up 
to a total of 13 weeks over the 5year period for each child. 
• Parents of disabled children may take time off in periods of one day if needed until the child is 18 
years old. 
• Emergency leave may be granted if there is a sudden breakdown in care arrangements. 
 
 
Source:   www.mymumworks.com 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics of the 130 dual career households 
 
Variable 
 
MALES 
 
FEMALES 
HOUSEHOLD 
AVERAGE 
AGE (respondent’s age in years; n=130)  
 
AGE (no children; n=47) 
AGE (dependent children; n=33) 
AGE (empty nesters; n=50) 
 
42.2  (8.5) 
 
37.0  (8.0) 
42.2  (7.4) 
47.0  (6.7) 
40.2 (8.2) 
 
35.0 (7.2) 
41.8 (6.9) 
44.0 (7.3) 
41.2 (8.4) 
 
36.0 (7.6) 
42.0 (7.1) 
45.5 (7.2) 
PAY(current annual gross pay in £000’s; n=130) 
 
PAY  (no children; n=47) 
PAY (dependent children; n=33) 
PAY (empty nesters; n=50) 
 
23.5 (10.4) 
 
19.9 (8.7) 
25.9 (9.3) 
25.6 (9.5) 
14.7  (9.1) 
 
16.5 (7.8) 
13.7 (9.7) 
 13.8  (9.8) 
 19.1 (10.7) 
 
18.2 (8.4) 
 19.8 (11.4) 
 19.7 (11.3) 
HOURS (average hours per week at work; n=130) 
 
HOURS (no children; n=47) 
HOURS(dependent children; n=33) 
HOURS (empty nesters; n=50) 
 
46.5 (10.4) 
 
 45.6  (9.4) 
 46.9 (11.3) 
 47.1 (10.9) 
  
 36.9 (11.8) 
 
41.0 (9.1) 
 35.4 (13.3) 
 34.1 (12.2) 
41.7 (12.1) 
 
43.3 (9.5) 
 41.2 (13.6) 
 40.6 (13.2) 
TENURE (time with current employer in years; 
n=130)  
 
TENURE  (no children; n=47) 
TENURE (dependent children; n=33) 
TENURE (empty nesters; n=50) 
 
 6.6  (6.9) 
 
 4.6  (6.0) 
 5.6  (5.6) 
 9.3  (7.7) 
 4.7 (5.3) 
 
 3.0 (4.5) 
 5.5 (6.1) 
 5.6 (5.2) 
 5.6 (6.2) 
 
 3.8 (5.3) 
 5.6 (5.8) 
 7.4 (6.8) 
Job Satisfaction ( % satisfied with job; n=130) 
 
JOBSAT (no children; n=47) 
JOBSAT(dependent children; n=33) 
JOBSAT (empty nesters; n=50) 
 
 92.0 
 
 89.0 
 94.0 
 92.0 
 92.0 
 
 91.0 
 85.0 
 96.0 
 92.0 
 
 90.0 
 89.0 
 94.0 
QUAL (% with a degree and /or professional 
qualification) 
86.0 85.2  
HE SECTOR (% employed in higher education sector) 
 
38.2 26.4  
PUBLIC SECTOR (% employed in public sector) 
 
  
13.2 22.8  
MANAGERIAL (% in managerial occupations) 
 
30.8 19.8  
PROFESSIONAL (% in professional occupations) 56.6 49.2  
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Table 3 
Benchmark Pay Level Model and Gender Difference Results  
 
Variable     Model 1 
   (n=260) 
    Males 
  (n=130) 
   Females 
   (n=130) 
Coefficient 
Differences 
constant      -4.903     
     (7.13)*** 
 -1.482 
 (0.99) 
 -5.168 
 (6.98)*** 
 -3.686 
 (2.21)** 
AGE       0.060     
     (3.25)*** 
  0.088 
 (3.52)*** 
  0.039 
 (1.57) 
 -0.049 
  (1.39) 
AGE2     -0.597E-3 
    (2.83)*** 
 -0.817E-3 
 (2.88)*** 
 -0.389E-3 
  (1.37) 
  0.427E-3 
 (1.06) 
LOG(HOURS)       1.695    
   (20.17)*** 
  1.159 
 (6.06)*** 
 1.792 
 (25.11)*** 
  0.634 
  (3.10)*** 
LOG(TENURE)       0.048     
     (2.63)*** 
  0.255E-3 
  (0.01) 
  0.059 
 (2.37)** 
 0.059 
 (1.54) 
QUAL 
 
      0.263     
    (4.81)*** 
 0.195 
 (2.53)*** 
  0.314 
 (4.19)*** 
  0.118 
 (1.10) 
HE SECTOR      -0.171      
     (3.55)*** 
 -0.192 
 (3.14)*** 
 -0.237 
 (3.45)*** 
 -0.045 
 (0.49) 
PUBLIC SECTOR      -0.255     
     (4.85)*** 
 -0.390 
 (4.07)*** 
 -0.241 
 (3.51)*** 
  0.149 
  (1.27) 
MANAGERIAL       0.188      
     (3.13)*** 
  0.320 
 (3.48)*** 
  0.063 
 (0.84) 
 -0.257 
 (2.15)** 
PROFESSIONAL       0.224      
     (3.64)*** 
  0.350 
 (3.32)*** 
 0.190 
 (2.68)*** 
 -0.160 
 (1.26) 
         
ADJUSTED R2        83.4%   68.6%   87.3%   85.1% 
         
Equation F RATIO       145.4***   32.3***   99.6***   79.0*** 
 
F-ratio for New Variables  
 
     N/A 
 
  N/A 
 
  N/A 
 
 3.94*** 
     
 
Notes:   
White (1980) Heteroskedasticity-Consistent t-values in parenthesis. 
Significance levels: *≤ 0.10;   **≤0.05;   ***≤ 0.01. 
F-ratio for New Variables and significance levels computed relative to Model 1. 
Coefficient Differences statistics computed from augmenting Model 1 with a gender dummy variable and 
gender interaction terms of each of the Model 1 independent variables. 
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Table 4 
Gender and Households with Children Relationships 
Variable     Model 2 
   (n=260) 
    Males 
  (n=130) 
   Females 
   (n=130) 
  Model 3 
  (n=260) 
constant      -2.758     
     (2.10)** 
 -0.985 
 (0.53) 
 -3.327 
 (2.00)** 
  -2.529 
  (2.02)** 
AGE       0.060     
     (3.28)*** 
  0.081 
 (3.14)*** 
  0.038 
 (1.58) 
  0.067 
  (3.80)*** 
AGE2     -0.599E-3 
    (2.90)*** 
 -0.756E-3 
 (2.63)*** 
 -0.381E-3 
  (1.36) 
 -0.640E-3 
 (3.24)*** 
LOG(HOURS)       1.412    
   (8.61)*** 
  1.112 
 (4.83)*** 
 1.548 
 (7.66)*** 
  1.366 
 (8.23)*** 
LOG(TENURE)       0.045     
     (2.44)*** 
  0.317E-3 
  (0.11) 
  0.058 
 (2.30)** 
  0.039 
 (2.08)** 
QUAL       0.272     
    (4.89)*** 
 0.202 
 (2.57)*** 
  0.324 
 (4.18)*** 
  0.246 
 (4.52)*** 
HE SECTOR      -0.169      
     (3.50)*** 
 -0.181 
 (2.99)*** 
 -0.238 
 (4.18)*** 
 -0.188 
 (4.02)*** 
PUBLIC SECTOR      -0.240     
     (4.46)*** 
 -0.369 
 (3.59)*** 
 -0.230 
 (3.29)*** 
 -0.280 
 (5.35)*** 
MANAGERIAL       0.187      
     (3.14)*** 
  0.314 
 (3.34)*** 
  0.069 
 (0.92) 
  0.182 
  (3.18)*** 
PROFESSIONAL       0.227      
     (3.69)*** 
  0.349 
 (3.27)*** 
 0.184 
 (2.56)*** 
  0.233 
 (3.97)*** 
CHILD 
 
    -2.556 
    (1.87)* 
 -0.465 
 (0.21) 
 -2.178 
(1.30) 
  
CHILD*LOG(HOURS) 
 
    0.340 
   (1.87)* 
  0.069 
 (0.23) 
  0.291 
 (1.33) 
 
CHILD*GENDER     -3.530 
 (2.60)*** 
CHILD*GENDER*LOG(HOURS)      0.455 
 (2.57)*** 
         
ADJUSTED R2        83.6%   68.3%   87.4%     84.6% 
         
Equation F RATIO       121.2***   26.3***   82.1***   130.2*** 
 
F-ratio for New Variables  
 
     2.83* 
 
  0.53 
 
  1.25 
 
  11.1*** 
 
Notes:  White (1980) Heteroskedasticity-Consistent t-values in parenthesis. 
Significance levels: *≤ 0.10;   **≤0.05;   ***≤ 0.01. 
F-ratio for New Variables and significance levels computed relative to Model 1. 
The dummy variable CHILD = 1 for individuals in “Households with Children”.  The 
“Households with Children” sub-sample consists of the 33 “dependent children” and the 50 
“empty nester” households.  
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Table 5 
Analyses By Household Type (Households with Children/No Children) 
 
 Households with Children 
(n=166) 
No Child Households 
(n=94) 
Variable      Model 1 Model 4   Model 1    Model 4 
constant      -5.302      
     (7.15)*** 
     -1.587      
     (0.86) 
 -2.607   
 (1.92)* 
 -1.338   
 (0.74) 
AGE       0.060   
    (2.44)** 
      0.053   
    (2.39)** 
  0.038  
 (1.16) 
  0.040  
 (1.22) 
AGE2     -0.625E-3 
    (2.29)** 
    -0.520E-3 
    (2.16)** 
  0.292E-3 
 (0.73) 
  0.320E-3 
 (0.80) 
LOG(HOURS)      1.749  
  (17.84)*** 
     1.296  
   (5.53)*** 
  1.459        
 (9.34)*** 
  1.292          
   (5.59)*** 
LOG(TENURE)     0.026 
   (1.24) 
    0.010 
   (0.43) 
  0.078        
(2.20)** 
  0.071          
   (2.20)** 
QUAL     0.282     
  (4.66)*** 
    0.263     
   (4.39)*** 
 0.191 
 (1.37) 
 0.191 
 (1.89)* 
HE SECTOR   -0.141   
  (2.38)*** 
   -0.168   
   (2.89)*** 
 -0.224      
(2.87)*** 
 -0.229      
(2.79)*** 
PUBLIC SECTOR   -0.212 
   (2.86)*** 
   -0.255 
   (3.29)*** 
 -0.309     
(4.55)*** 
 -0.317     
(4.69)*** 
MANAGERIAL     0.237 
    (3.03)*** 
    0.219 
   (2.92)*** 
 0.086   
(0.96) 
 0.083   
(0.92) 
PROFESSIONAL     0.262 
   (3.18)*** 
    0.267 
   (3.43)*** 
 0.150 
(1.72)* 
 0.162 
(1.76)* 
GENDER    -4.100 
  (2.21)** 
  -1.902 
 (0.79) 
GENDER*LOG(HOURS) 
 
            0.523 
  (2.18)**       
   0.248 
 (0.79) 
                     
ADJUSTED R2            87.6%       89.0%   61.7%   61.1% 
     
Equation F RATIO 
 
        130.4***    122.4***   17.7***   14.3*** 
F RATIO for New Variables        N/A       11.0***   N/A    0.3 
 
Notes:   
White (1980) Heteroskedasticity-Consistent t-values in parenthesis. 
Significance levels: * <= 0.10;   **<=0.05;   ***< = 0.01. 
F-ratio for New Variables and significance levels computed relative to Model 1. 
The “Households with Children” sub-sample consists of the 33 “dependent children” and the 50 
“empty nester” households.  
